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FISHER, Circuit Judge 
Jason Moreno was involved in a mortgage-fraud 
scheme as an appraiser who supplied inflated appraisals to 
other members of the scheme in exchange for money. He was 
also more directly involved—as broker, buyer, or seller, for 
instance—in other fraudulent transactions. At trial, Moreno 
was found guilty of five counts of wire fraud and two counts 
of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. After receiving his 
sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, Moreno appealed. 
Three issues are presented in this appeal. First, at trial, 
a cooperating witness read statements of a non-testifying U.S. 
Secret Service Special Agent into the record, which Moreno 
claims violated both the Confrontation Clause and the rule 
against hearsay.  Second, at sentencing, the District Court 
concluded that there were more than 50 victims in the case 
and thus applied a four-level enhancement under the 
Sentencing Guidelines on that basis. Moreno contends that 
the record does not support such a finding and that the 
District Court’s application of the enhancement was plain 
error. Third, during Moreno’s sentencing allocution, the 
prosecutor, without leave of court, engaged in a vigorous 
cross-examination of Moreno. On appeal, Moreno says that 
the District Court plainly erred in permitting this cross-
examination. We will affirm Moreno’s conviction and the 
District Court’s application of the sentencing enhancement, 
but we will vacate Moreno’s sentence and remand for 
resentencing based on the violation of Moreno’s right of 
allocution. 
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I. 
A. 
 This case arose out of mortgage-fraud schemes that 
were perpetrated in the Pittsburgh area from July 2005 to 
November 2007, and centers on the involvement of Jason 
Moreno, an appraiser. Moreno and his business partner, Joel 
Reck, started an appraisal company called Platinum Appraisal 
Services. Reck was a licensed appraiser, but Moreno was not. 
Early in Platinum Appraisal Services’s existence, Reck 
became ill and, for the most part, stopped working. To fill the 
void left by Reck, Moreno began performing the appraisal 
work himself, frequently signing Reck’s name electronically 
to appraisals without Reck’s knowledge. Many of these 
appraisals violated professional norms and assigned inflated 
values to properties. Moreno provided these appraisals to two 
different companies engaged in mortgage-fraud schemes: 
Pittsburgh Home Loans, which was owned by a mortgage 
broker named Robert Arakelian; and Easy Realty Solutions, 
which was owned and operated by James Platts.  
 The Pittsburgh Home Loans scheme worked by 
helping home-buyers with bad credit and limited assets get 
lender financing. To accomplish this in a given transaction, 
Arakelian of Pittsburgh Home Loans would provide a false 
settlement statement at closing, which would contain an 
inflated sales price. Based on the inflated sales price, a bank 
would lend more than the actual sales price of a property, and 
the extra money would cover the cost a down payment, 
closing costs, and a payment to Arakelian. As a result, banks 
often gave loans in amounts that were 120-300% of the actual 
purchase price. Because a lender would receive paperwork 
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representing the inflated purchase price, the lender would 
believe the loan met its underwriting guidelines (typically an 
80-95% loan-to-value ratio). At closing, however, loan 
proceeds would be distributed according to the true nature of 
the transaction: the seller would receive less than the reported 
purchase price, Arakelian would receive an undisclosed 
payment, and loan funds would be used to make the down-
payment and cover closing costs. A number of people were 
essential to the successful operation of the scheme,1 including 
Moreno, whose appraisals matched the fraudulent sales prices 
provided by Arakelian. 
 The Easy Realty Solutions scheme was similar. Platts 
of Easy Realty Solutions located distressed houses and buyers 
to whom they could be sold, and then acted as a secret 
intermediary to the transactions. Platts would purchase a 
house and then resell it to a buyer at a higher price using a 
mortgage transaction. Buyers paid nothing out of pocket. 
Easy Realty Solutions’s involvement as an intermediary was 
concealed from lenders so that, in a given transaction, it 
appeared that the original seller sold the house directly to the 
eventual buyer. Platts would pocket the difference between 
the sales prices. Platts made numerous misrepresentations to 
lenders: he concealed his role as conduit; he misrepresented 
                                              
1 Michael Ferrazza, Arakelian’s business partner, 
located prospective buyers through an entity known as 
Mortgage 911; Karen Atkinson and Daniel Sporrer, Esq., 
prepared false settlement statements and prematurely 
disbursed loan funds to allow their use as down payments; 
Crystal Spreng, a branch manager at Citizens Bank, falsely 
certified buyers’ assets and provided certified checks in 
buyers’ names bought with prematurely disbursed loan 
proceeds.  
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buyers’ assets; he falsified settlement statements to show that 
buyers were making down payments that Platts had actually 
made and that buyers had received permissible seller 
financing that was actually a sham.2 For this scheme, Moreno 
provided inflated appraisals to support the higher values 
needed.  
 At trial, the government offered documentary evidence 
of 110 mortgage transactions—which were financed by 24 
different lenders—that were affected by one scheme or the 
other. Testimonial evidence was provided for some of those 
transactions; the government called 15 buyers as witnesses, 
each of whom testified that the house he or she purchased was 
in poor condition and had been purchased with no down 
payment. Most buyers who testified stated that they went into 
foreclosure shortly after closing.  
 Moreno gave inflated values for houses he appraised. 
Pittsburgh Home Loans used Moreno specifically because he 
was willing to provide the necessary inflated appraisals, and, 
in exchange, Pittsburgh Home Loans would pay Moreno an 
extra fee ranging from $300 to $800. Moreno did not offer 
objective opinions of value but instead started with the 
predetermined value requested by Pittsburgh Home Loans 
and worked backwards, manipulating the selection of 
comparable houses and misrepresenting condition reports for 
properties. The government introduced testimony from buyers 
and sellers who said that the houses in these transactions were 
in far worse condition than reported; the government also 
introduced an expert-witness appraiser who evaluated twelve 
Platinum Appraisal Services appraisals and concluded that 
                                              
2 Platts also relied on other participants in his scheme, 
including Deean Haggerty, a mortgage broker, and Bernard 
Flugher, Esq., a closing agent. 
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each substantially overstated the actual value of the house. In 
some instances, Moreno received extra payments from buyers 
for whom he was providing inflated appraisals. For example, 
Earl Rodgers, a buyer who worked with Arakelian, paid 
Moreno an extra $500 because the comparable houses would 
not substantiate the necessary value. Once paid, Moreno drew 
up an appraisal with the requested value.  
 Moreno provided similarly inflated appraisals for Easy 
Realty Solutions. For example, in one transaction, Easy 
Realty Solutions purchased a property for $95,000 and sold it 
almost immediately to a buyer with bad credit and no money 
for $130,000. Platinum Appraisal Services valued the 
property at $145,000, citing numerous improvements that had 
never actually been done. Easy Realty Solutions took 
approximately $26,000 of the loan proceeds.  
 Moreno’s involvement in the Pittsburgh Home Loans 
and Easy Realty Solutions schemes was not limited to 
providing inflated appraisals. The government introduced 
evidence that in seven instances Moreno co-brokered deals or 
arranged to purchase properties. By so doing, he received 
significant payments from the loan proceeds. In one deal, 
Moreno and Platts purchased a property for $50,000 and 
resold it the same day for $95,000. Moreno appraised it at 
$95,000, once again using Reck’s name. Moreno received 
$2,500 of the buyer’s earnest money and $16,500 once the 
deal closed.  
 Moreno and Arakelian completed several similar 
transactions. For instance, Moreno purchased a house for 
$19,000 and, with Arakelian’s help, sold it to an 
impoverished buyer the same day for $70,000. Moreno 
appraised the property at $70,000. Arakelian took $13,000 
from the loan proceeds, and Moreno took roughly $12,000. 
Moreno’s appraisal of that house stated that it was 
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functionally adequate, had no physical deficiencies, and had 
been completely remodeled. None of this was true: the house 
was in deplorable condition. In another deal, Moreno 
purchased a house through his mother for $95,000. Despite 
serious problems with the septic tank (which he did not 
disclose), Moreno appraised the property at $180,000. The 
settlement statement showed a $37,000 cash payment at 
closing, which the buyer had never made. Moreno took more 
than $21,000 from the loan proceeds, and Arakelian took 
roughly $12,000.  
 Moreno purchased another house for $72,000. He 
appraised the house at $135,000, misrepresented the house’s 
condition, provided false information about bank accounts 
and his monthly income, and falsely represented that he was 
putting $40,000 into the purchase. Arakelian convinced the 
realtor to change the listing price so that the lender would not 
discover that Moreno’s appraisal overstated the house’s actual 
value. Moreno participated in several other similar 
transactions from which he profited.  
B. 
 Moreno was charged with two counts of conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; and five 
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2. 
He pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. On September 
19, 2013, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all seven 
counts.  
 Arakelian was one of the government’s cooperating 
witnesses at trial. On cross-examination, defense counsel 
attempted to impeach Arakelian with his government 
cooperation. Specifically, Moreno’s lawyer asked Arakelian 
questions about how his sentence could be affected by his 
cooperation against Moreno. Early in the government’s direct 
examination of him, however, Arakelian had admitted that he 
9 
 
had entered into a plea agreement with the government, that 
he was cooperating with the government, and that he hoped to 
receive a lighter sentence as a result of his cooperation. 
Defense counsel’s cross-examination on this subject was 
duplicative of Arakelian’s earlier testimony. 
 Nevertheless, on redirect, the prosecutor sought to 
admit as substantive evidence portions of memoranda written 
by U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Keith Heckman, which 
summarized Heckman’s pretrial interviews with Arakelian. 
Defense counsel objected, though it is unclear whether he did 
so on the basis of hearsay or the Confrontation Clause. The 
prosecutor argued that the memoranda should be admitted 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which 
permits as non-hearsay prior consistent statements of a 
witness offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or 
improper influence. The District Court overruled the 
objection and admitted the evidence.  
 The prosecutor gave Arakelian four memoranda of 
interviews to review silently. Arakelian confirmed that each 
accurately reflected information he had provided, and so the 
prosecutor then had Arakelian read portions of each into the 
record. The portions included Heckman’s assertions that: 
according to Arakelian, Moreno greatly inflated values and 
was sometimes paid extra for doing so; Moreno partnered 
with Arakelian on the acquisition of a property and pocketed 
some of the loan proceeds; and Moreno thought he was 
insulated from criminal liability for the fraud because the 
appraisals bore Reck’s signature.    
 In February 2014, Moreno was sentenced. At the 
sentencing, Moreno called eight character witnesses. Defense 
counsel asked questions of each, and the prosecutor 
questioned three of them.  After the final witness, defense 
counsel informed the Court that Moreno wanted to exercise 
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his right of allocution.  Then Moreno, under oath, addressed 
the Court directly without questions from defense counsel. He 
asked the Court for mercy and listed several mitigating 
circumstances for the Court—among other things, he 
apologized to his victims, explained that he was relatively 
young when he committed the crimes, spoke of recent 
changes in his life, said that he had become more religious, 
and stated that he was dedicating his life to preventing others 
from making the mistakes he had made. He also stated that he 
was prepared to accept the consequences of his actions, and 
he asked the Court for mercy. He did not attempt to re-contest 
factual issues of innocence and guilt. 
 When Moreno had finished speaking, the prosecutor—
without leave of court—engaged in an extensive cross-
examination in which he questioned Moreno about his 
criminal conduct. Defense counsel did not object. Moreno, 
who had not testified at trial, had no choice but to testify on 
matters of his guilt. The prosecutor explained to the District 
Court, “[W]hat I’m trying to figure out is what . . . he 
knowingly, fraudulently submitted to the lenders.” (App. 
1706-07). The prosecutor asked Moreno: “Tell the Court, 
what were the other lies that were in these appraisals that you 
were submitting to the lender?” (App. 1704). When Moreno 
asked for clarification on a question, the prosecutor 
responded, “Tell the Court, you’re the one accepting 
responsibility now.” (App. 1705). The prosecutor got Moreno 
to admit that the evidence of fraud introduced at trial was 
“just the tip of the iceberg.” (App. 1710).  
 After the cross-examination, the District Court offered 
defense counsel the opportunity to ask questions, which he 
took. The District Court then made findings of fact regarding 
the testimony of the witnesses, Moreno’s statement, and the 
prosecutor’s cross-examination. The prosecutor’s sentencing 
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argument addressed Moreno’s statement and then argued that 
the seriousness of the offense had been “ratcheted up” based 
on what he had been able to “drag out” of Moreno on cross-
examination. (App. 1755). The prosecutor also referred to the 
cross-examination to undercut Moreno’s expression of 
remorse.  
 When explaining the sentence, the District Court 
referenced the cross-examination in rejecting various defense 
arguments for a lower sentence. The District Court also noted 
Moreno’s admission during the cross-examination that he had 
prepared more than the 110 fraudulent appraisals that had 
been proven at trial. The District Court also concluded that 
the case involved more than 50 victims and thus imposed a 
four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2). 
Defense counsel did not object to the application of this 
sentencing enhancement.  
 After concluding that Moreno had a criminal history 
category of I and a total offense level of 33, the District Court 
determined that the applicable Guidelines range was 135–168 
months’ imprisonment. The Court varied downward based 
primarily on Moreno’s post-offense rehabilitation and after 
consideration of all the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
The District Court then imposed a sentence of 96 months’ 
imprisonment for each count, which were to run concurrently, 
three years’ supervised release, and $20,000 in restitution. 
Following the sentence, Moreno appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the 
prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
 This Court exercises “plenary review over 
Confrontation Clause challenges, but review[s] a 
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nonconstitutional challenge to the admission of hearsay for 
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 
125 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).3  
 Unpreserved challenges to the application of 
sentencing enhancements are reviewed for plain error, United 
States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2007), as are 
unpreserved violations of the right of allocution, United 
States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 2014). “For 
reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1) an error; (2) 
that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) which 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 
313–14 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 
U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997)). 
III. 
A. 
 The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause bars 
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not 
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).   
 
                                              
3 Unpreserved Confrontation Clause challenges are 
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 
161, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2005). The parties disagree over 
whether Moreno preserved the Confrontation Clause issue. 
For the purposes of this Opinion, we will assume without 
deciding that the issue was preserved. 
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1. 
 Our Confrontation Clause inquiry is twofold. “First, a 
court should determine whether the contested statement by an 
out-of-court declarant qualifies as testimonial under Davis [v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)] and its progeny.” Berrios, 
676 F.3d at 127 (footnote omitted). “[S]tatements made under 
circumstances that would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial are testimonial.” United States v. 
Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005). The core class of 
testimonial statements includes “material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant 
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) (alteration 
omitted) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52).   
 The second step in our Confrontation Clause inquiry 
requires that a court apply the appropriate safeguard: “If the 
absent witness’s statement is testimonial, then the 
Confrontation Clause requires ‘unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.’” Berrios, 676 F.3d at 127 
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).   
 It is clear that a Confrontation Clause violation 
occurred here. First, the memoranda that Arakelian read into 
the record were testimonial. They were Heckman’s 
summaries of what Arakelian purportedly told him during a 
series of interviews—that is to say, they are investigative 
reports prepared by a government agent in actual anticipation 
of trial. As such, they were “statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
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reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310 
(2009) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). Second, Heckman 
was available but did not testify at trial. 4  
2. 
 Our conclusion that a Confrontation Clause violation 
occurred, however, does not end the analysis. If we determine 
that the error was harmless, we may nevertheless affirm the 
conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Jimenez, 
513 F.3d 62, 78 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The erroneous admission of 
testimonial hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause is 
simply an error in the trial process itself that we may affirm if 
the error was harmless.” (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error 
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a 
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). “[T]he 
relevant question under Chapman is not whether, in a trial 
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely 
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” 
United States v. Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 337 (3d 
Cir. 2010)).  
 We consider several factors in determining whether a 
Confrontation Clause violation was harmless to a defendant, 
such as “the importance of the testimony to the Government’s 
case, the cumulative nature of the evidence, the existence of 
corroborating evidence, the extent of cross-examination 
allowed in the case, and the strength of the Government’s 
case as a whole.” Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 78 (citing Delaware v. 
                                              
4 The government does not contest this conclusion.  
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Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)). We conclude that the 
Confrontation Clause violation was harmless because the 
statements were of limited importance to the government’s 
case and because the government’s case against Moreno was, 
as a whole, very strong. 
 First, the statements at issue, Heckman’s memoranda, 
played a small role in the government’s case. The prosecutor 
introduced the memoranda after defense counsel cross-
examined Arakelian about his cooperation with the 
government. The memoranda merely summarized what 
Arakelian had told Heckman in a series of interviews before 
Arakelian entered into a plea agreement with the government. 
The purpose of introducing the memoranda, then, was to 
rebut defense counsel’s attempt to undermine Arakelian’s 
credibility. But defense counsel’s cross-examination in this 
regard added nothing to what Arakelian had already admitted 
at the beginning of direct examination: that he had entered 
into a plea agreement with the government, that he was 
cooperating with the government in the Moreno investigation, 
and that he was doing so in order to receive a more lenient 
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sentence. (App. 223). The memoranda were, therefore, not 
important to the government’s case.5 
 Second, the government’s case as a whole was 
undeniably strong. That would remain true even if we were to 
discount the entirety of Arakelian’s testimony. The Easy 
Realty Solutions scheme was not connected to the Pittsburgh 
Home Loans scheme that was run by Arakelian. Moreno’s 
involvement in that scheme was proved by other witnesses, 
such as Bernhard Flugher, who performed closings on behalf 
of Easy Realty Solutions, and Deean Haggerty, who was a 
mortgage officer associated with the scheme. The government 
also presented substantial evidence that Moreno participated 
in—and personally profited from—several real estate deals, 
some of which did not even involve Arakelian. Furthermore, 
                                              
5 It is important not to conflate Heckman’s 
memoranda—which violated the Confrontation Clause—with 
Arakelian’s in-court testimony—which did not. If we view 
the transcript of Arakelian’s time on the witness stand without 
Heckman’s improperly admitted memoranda, the ultimate 
effect is the same. Defense counsel’s limited cross-
examination questions touching on Arakelian’s cooperation 
with the government did not unravel the lengthy and detailed 
testimony that Arakelian had provided. In fact, it added 
nothing to what Arakelian had already admitted on direct 
examination. Omitting Heckman’s statements does not alter 
the value of Arakelian’s testimony. Rather, the Heckman 
memoranda merely showed that Arakelian had made prior 
statements that were consistent with his testimony, which was 
of little value because the cross-examination added nothing to 
what Arakelian had already admitted on direct. In this regard, 
the out-of-court statements were cumulative, and that factor 
also weighs in favor of finding harmlessness. 
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the government introduced testimony about Moreno’s 
involvement with Arakelian from other witnesses. For 
example, Joel Reck, Moreno’s business partner at Platinum 
Appraisal Services, testified that Moreno regularly provided 
fraudulent appraisals, that Moreno signed Reck’s name to 
hundreds of appraisals without his knowledge; that these 
appraisals dramatically overvalued properties; and that 
Moreno said he would deny his own participation in creating 
the appraisals to which he had signed Reck’s name. (App. 
815–16).  
 The record reveals a strong government case that was 
not affected at all by the admission of Heckman’s 
statements—the guilty verdict here was surely unattributable 
to the unnecessary rehabilitation provided by the 
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memoranda.6 Thus, despite our conclusion that a 
Confrontation Clause violation occurred, we will affirm the 
verdict because the government has demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the guilty verdict here was not affected 
by the admission of statements from Heckman’s memoranda. 
3. 
 Moreno also contends that the admission of 
Heckman’s statements was a violation of the rule against 
hearsay. A preserved evidentiary error is harmless if “it is 
‘highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.’” United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 295 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 
372, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2012)). Thus, the government needs to 
meet a slightly less onerous standard: if it is highly probable 
                                              
6 The other factors in this analysis are less pertinent 
under these circumstances, but we will address them briefly. 
As for “the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,” 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, this factor weighs in favor of a 
finding of harmlessness because Arakelian’s own prior 
testimony regarding his cooperation is consistent with 
Heckman’s memoranda. Furthermore, Moreno has not 
pointed to any evidence that contradicts Heckman’s 
memoranda or anything in the record that suggests that 
Arakelian made up his testimony after entering into a plea 
agreement with the government. As for the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, it has to be acknowledged 
that no other cross-examination of Heckman was permitted 
because Heckman did not testify. However, in light of the 
other factors and the limited subject matter on which 
Heckman could have been cross-examined, this factor alone 
does not alter our conclusion.  
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that the hearsay violation did not contribute to the verdict, 
then we should affirm.  
 Having already concluded that the Confrontation 
Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we 
need not reach the hearsay issue. Even if we concluded that 
the District Court’s admission of the testimony was a hearsay 
violation, it would necessarily be harmless.   
B. 
 We turn now to Moreno’s contention that the District 
Court erred in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement 
for 50 or more victims. Because Moreno failed to object that 
the District Court had incorrectly applied the Guidelines, we 
review for plain error. Wood, 486 F.3d at 790. We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation of the 
Guidelines. United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 118 (3d Cir. 
2014). The burden of proof for facts at sentencing is 
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Grier, 475 
F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007). On appeal, we “review factual 
findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error.” Id. at 570. 
“A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted). 
 The Sentencing Guidelines provide that if the offense 
“involved 50 or more victims,” a four-level enhancement 
should be applied. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (amended 
2015). A victim under § 2B1.1 is “any person who 
sustained . . . actual loss.” Smith, 751 F.3d at 118 (quoting 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1). “‘Actual loss,’ in turn, is defined 
as ‘the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted 
from the offense.”’ Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 
n.3(A)(i)). Pecuniary harm is monetary harm or harm that is 
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otherwise measureable in money. Id. The bar is not high. For 
example, in the bank fraud context, monetary harm can 
include even “the expenditure of time and money to regain 
misappropriated funds and replace compromised bank 
accounts.” Id. at 119. The reason for this is that “an account 
holder who must spend time and resources to dispute 
fraudulent activity, recoup stolen funds, and repair his or her 
credit and financial security has suffered a monetizable loss 
that is a reasonably foreseeable and direct consequence of the 
defendant’s theft or fraud.” Id.  
 The District Court noted that evidence had been 
introduced at trial that Moreno was responsible for over 110 
fraudulent appraisals and that the presentence report indicated 
that the number was closer to 250 fraudulent appraisals. (App. 
1769, 1792). This alone would be sufficient to establish that 
more than 50 victims were affected by Moreno’s crimes 
because buyers paid for appraisals that were fraudulent. There 
is also the financial impact on buyers who were induced by 
Moreno’s appraisals to purchase properties for prices above 
their market values. As the District Court explained, 
Moreno’s criminal conduct “involved the procurement of 
fraudulent loans which totaled in excess of $9 million and 
caused losses between $1 million and $2.5 million to lenders 
and the unsophisticated buyers who were duped into 
purchasing properties well in excess of their true fair market 
values . . . .” (App. 1769).  
 On this record, the District Court’s conclusion that 
more than 50 victims were affected by Moreno’s crimes was 
not clearly erroneous. We will therefore affirm its application 
of the four-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). 
21 
 
C. 
  
 Finally, we turn to the issue of allocution. Before 
imposing sentence, a district court must “address the 
defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak 
or present any information to mitigate the sentence . . . .” Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(2). Moreno contends that this right 
was violated when, immediately following the allocution, the 
prosecutor engaged in a vigorous and lengthy cross-
examination of him. Moreno concedes that the issue was not 
preserved and is therefore subject to plain error review. 
 
1. 
 “‘The right of allocution is deeply rooted in our legal 
tradition’ and dates back to at least the fifteenth century.” 
United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Adams, 252 
F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2001)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2684 
(2014). Although the right of allocution “is not a right 
guaranteed by the Constitution,” we have explained that 
Congress, “acknowledging the historical and common law 
roots of the right of allocution, . . . codified the right in 1944 
by promulgating Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.” Id. 
at 181. “Furthermore, while the right of allocution is not 
constitutional, nonetheless it is ancient in origin, and it is the 
type of important safeguard that helps assure the fairness, and 
hence legitimacy, of the sentencing process.” Adams, 252 
F.3d at 288 (citing Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 
304–05 (1961)). 
 As we stated in Ward, the critical purpose of Rule 32 
is threefold: “(1) to allow the defendant to present mitigating 
circumstances, (2) to permit the defendant to present personal 
characteristics to enable the sentencing court to craft an 
22 
 
individualized sentence, and (3) to preserve the appearance of 
fairness in the criminal justice system.”  Ward, 732 F.3d at 
181. We further explained that “allocution ‘is designed to 
temper punishment with mercy in appropriate cases, and to 
ensure that sentencing reflects individualized 
circumstances.’” Id. (quoting United States v. De Alba Pagan, 
33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)). Allocution also “has value 
in terms of maximizing the perceived equity of the process, 
because the defendant is given the right to speak on any 
subject of his choosing prior to the imposition of 
sentence.” Id. at 181–82 (emphasis added) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted).   
 The government contends that the District Court did 
not err in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine Moreno 
because Rule 32 does not explicitly prohibit cross-
examination and because neither the Supreme Court nor our 
Court of Appeals has ever specifically held that the practice is 
impermissible.7 But cross-examination is still contrary to the 
                                              
7 Nevertheless, at argument, appellate counsel for the 
Government explained that it was not the Office’s policy or 
practice to cross-examine a defendant at allocution. She 
further explained that it was not trial counsel’s specific 
practice either but that, in this instance, he became 
overzealous when he perceived Moreno’s statements to be 
testimony in support of a sentencing variance. While district 
courts must be vigilant in protecting the right to allocution, 
which is an opportunity for the defendant to personally 
address the court, a defendant who wants to give testimony 
still must take the stand and be made available for cross-
examination. In this case, however, appellate counsel 
conceded that Moreno’s statements were not testimonial but 
were “a classic allocution.” 
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purpose of allocution as outlined in Rule 32, which is to 
“permit the defendant to speak or present any information to 
mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii).  As 
we said in Ward: “The reason for allocution is not to permit 
the defendant to re-contest the factual issues of innocence and 
guilt. Rather, the purpose of allocution is to afford the 
defendant an opportunity to raise mitigating circumstances 
and to present his individualized situation to the sentencing 
court.” Ward, 732 F.3d at 182.  
 In his statement to the District Court, Moreno did not 
attempt to re-contest factual issues of guilt or innocence. To 
the contrary, Moreno presented personal characteristics and 
explained at length that, though he had gone to trial, he was 
accepting responsibility for his crimes. But the prosecutor 
used his cross-examination to do exactly what we said in 
Ward was impermissible for a defendant to do: he bolstered 
the factual case against Moreno by drawing out several 
admissions about the scope of the conspiracy, which he then 
used in his sentencing argument. 
 Cross-examination on the subject of Moreno’s guilt 
was contrary to the purpose of Rule 32 and to the purposes of 
allocution as stated in Ward. The District Court thus 
committed error in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine 
Moreno. 
2. 
 We also hold that the error was plain because it was 
clear and obvious in light of this Court’s discussion in Ward.  
The government argues that, if there was error, it could not 
have been plain since no authority (a constitutional or 
statutory text or precedent of the Supreme Court or this 
Circuit) specifically states that cross-examination is not 
permitted during allocution. But this argument takes an overly 
constricted view of our prior authority. That no previous 
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cases have explicitly proscribed cross-examination during 
allocution does not mean that clear authority does not exist on 
the subject. To the contrary, Ward provides clear authority on 
the purpose of allocution: “the purpose of Rule 32 is to give 
the defendant an opportunity to speak about mitigating 
circumstances and offer his reasoning for a more lenient 
sentence.”  Ward, 732 F.3d at 183. The issue in Ward was 
whether the defendant had the right to deliver an unsworn 
allocution. In holding that he did not have such a right, we 
reasoned, “[w]hether an allocution is sworn or unsworn does 
not affect a defendant’s right to make a statement to the 
sentencing court nor does it subvert the policy goals of Rule 
32.”  Id. at 182.  Cross-examination, on the other hand, 
clearly affects a defendant’s right to make a statement to the 
court and subverts the policy goals of Rule 32 as elucidated in 
Ward.8  
                                              
8 In Ward we distinguished a case from an 
intermediate Tennessee appellate court, State v. Keathly, 145 
S.W.3d 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), which we said 
“appear[ed] to be the only court to have addressed the right to 
an unsworn allocution.” Ward, 732 F.3d at 183 n.7. The court 
in Keathly found that the defendant’s right of allocution had 
been violated because the defendant should have been 
“permitted to make an unsworn statement to the court without 
having been subjected to rigorous cross-examination.” 
Keathly, 145 S.W.3d at 130. We said that “the fact that the 
allocution was subject to cross-examination appears to be the 
dispositive issue in Keathly.” Ward, 732 F.3d at 183 n.7. The 
defendant in Ward had not been cross-examined, and we 
distinguished Keathly on that basis. In this case, however, we 
are dealing with a defendant who was subjected to cross-
examination during allocution.  
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 The lengthy cross-examination specifically 
questioning Moreno on his criminal behavior (including 
actions that were not even brought up at trial) was clearly 
contrary to the purpose of Rule 32 as we have explained it.  
3. 
 Plain error review also requires us to find that the 
District Court’s error affected Moreno’s substantial 
rights. With respect to this prejudice prong, we have 
explained, “in the context of violations of the right of 
allocution, ‘as a general matter . . . prejudice should be 
presumed whenever the opportunity exists for this violation to 
have played a role in the district court’s sentencing 
decision.’” Paladino, 769 F.3d at 201 (quoting Adams, 252 
F.3d at 289).  
 Here, the record actually demonstrates prejudice. The 
prosecutor made use of the information from the cross-
examination in his sentencing argument, saying, “I want to 
first talk about Mr. Moreno’s testimony today.” (App. 1754). 
He specifically argued: “the loss amount is much more than 
as stated in the guidelines as, we know now, because Mr. 
Moreno has admitted that this was the tip of the iceberg in 
terms of the fraud he was personally involved in. So the 
seriousness of the offense, Your Honor, has now ratcheted 
up.” (App. 1755) (emphasis added). Moments later, the 
prosecutor stated, “We had to drag it out of him, but 
eventually Mr. Moreno admitted that one of the things they 
were doing was providing elevated values of the properties 
serving as collateral for these loans.” Id.  
 The District Court then relied on the contents of the 
cross-examination in making sentencing determinations. In 
concluding that a variance was not warranted on the basis of a 
policy disagreement with the Guidelines, the District Court 
said, “there were at least 100 fraudulent transactions proven 
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in this court,” and “[t]here are at least 250 more that 
occurred . . . based on Mr. Moreno’s testimony here.”  (App. 
1765) (emphasis added). Later, the Court said, “The Court 
would note and I think Mr. Moreno acknowledged here today, 
he committed much of these crimes even before he became a 
licensed appraiser.” (App. 1774) (emphasis added). When 
going through factors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 
Court stated, “The other thing that strikes me here is that this 
was two conspiracies, but, as you stated here today, it went 
beyond those.” (App. 1792) (emphasis added). The District 
Court thus relied on the substance of the impermissible cross-
examination in reaching a sentence, and so, even though 
prejudice is presumed, it has been demonstrated in this case.  
4. 
 The fourth prong of plain error review is met if the 
matter affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings and “is satisfied where a violation of the 
right of allocution has been established.” Paladino, 769 F.3d 
at 201–02. Thus, “a defendant is automatically entitled to 
resentencing if the trial court violates the defendant’s right of 
allocution.” Adams, 252 F.3d at 281. 
  Because all four prongs have been met, we hold that it 
was plain error for the District Court to permit Moreno to be 
cross-examined during his allocution. We therefore remand 
the case to the District Court for resentencing. 
5. 
 Even if we were to conclude that the error in this case 
was not plain (and we do not so hold), we would nevertheless 
exercise our supervisory power and hold that a defendant may 
not be cross-examined during allocution. Courts of appeals 
have the power “to mandate ‘procedures deemed desirable 
from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in 
nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.’” 
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Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146–47 (1985) (quoting Cupp 
v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)); see also United 
States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 843 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]here 
is no doubt that this Court has supervisory power to 
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the better 
administration of the judicial process.”). We have noted that 
“our supervisory authority should not be invoked lightly.” 
United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 205 (3d Cir. 2007), as 
amended (July 2, 2007) (quoting Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, 
Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991)). But, given the 
importance of the right of allocution and the potential of 
cross-examination to subvert the goals of allocution, we 
would not hesitate to invoke our supervisory authority in this 
instance. Thus, if Rule 32 did not prohibit cross-examination 
of a defendant during allocution, we would still mandate the 
procedure that at sentencing a defendant must be provided the 
opportunity to speak directly to the court, either sworn or 
unsworn, and not be subject to cross-examination.9  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Moreno’s 
conviction. We will also affirm the District Court’s 
application of the sentencing enhancement.  We will, 
however, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing 
because of the violation of Moreno’s right of allocution. 
                                              
9 We reiterate here that “the defendant’s right of 
allocution is not unlimited” and that “[t]he sentencing judge 
has always retained the discretion to place certain restrictions 
on what may be presented during an allocution.” Ward, 732 
F.3d at 182. Our holding today is not to the contrary. 
 
